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THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM. By 
Richard A. Posner.t Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 1985. Pp. xi, 365. $25.00. 
Maurice J. Holland2 
As its title indicates, this is a book which asserts that the fed-
eral courts are in a state of crisis, undertakes to describe and ana-
lyze the nature of that crisis, and proposes a variety of remedies by 
which the author believes it might be alleviated. It is a work that 
deserves wide readership and thoughtful consideration simply be-
cause of its many intrinsic merits, and is likely to elicit special inter-
est because Judge Posner has often been mentioned in the media as 
among the youngish, conservative, academically oriented jurists 
which the present administration has under consideration for future 
elevation to the Supreme Court. Should his nomination eventuate, 
no Supreme Court nominee since Felix Frankfurter3 will have ex-
pressed himself so explicitly and forthrightly concerning the appro-
priate role and functioning of the federal judiciary as has Judge 
Posner in this volume. Although the principal thrust of this work is 
an institutional analysis of the explosive growth in the work load of 
the federal courts over the past two decades and what is argued to 
have been the inadequate, even deleterious responses, there is also 
extensive discussion of the author's judicial philosophy, including 
his theories of constitutional and statutory interpretation and his 
conception of the legislative function of federal courts as formula-
tors of federal common law. 
It has for some time been a commonplace assertion, both of 
judges and commentators, that the federal courts have experienced 
in recent decades a dramatic increase in the number of cases initi-
ated and litigated at all levels, and that this increase has been met 
with a disproportionately meager augmentation of resources, pri-
marily the number of judges, with which to cope with the onslaught 
of litigation.4 Judge Posner's statistics break little new ground in 
I. Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
2. Professor and Acting Dean, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. 
3. f. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1928), was in some respects a precursor of the 
present work, a lineage acknowledged by Judge Posner in his preface. 
4. See. e.g., Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 
(1976): Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary 1979, 65 A.B.A. J. 358 (Mar. 1979); Ed· 
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this regard, though he does supply some interesting and informative 
refinements based on caseload data supplied by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts. Among these are tabulations 
and accompanying analyses of the number of cases fully tried as 
opposed to simply filed in the district courts in 1983 compared with 
the base year 1960 (21,047 compared with 10,003},s the increase 
over the same period in the average number of trial days of cases 
terminated in the district courts (3.1 compared with 2.2),6 and the 
probably greater complexity of cases decided by the courts of ap-
peals. 1 These and other interpolations from the gross data all sug-
gest that focusing simply on the number of cases filed or terminated 
considerably understates the magnitude of the caseload crisis. 
Where this book does break much new and valuable ground is 
in its analyses of the "supply side" in producing the current imbal-
ance between the demand for, and supply of, the resources of the 
federal judiciary. In Judge Posner's base year, 1960, there were 322 
article III judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court. By 
1983, the number of federal judges had more than doubled, to 657,s 
with, of course, no additions at the Supreme Court level. This was 
in response to an increase over the same period from 79,200 to 
277,031 cases filed in the district courts,9 from 3,765 to 29,580 cases 
filed in the courts of appeals,w and from 1,940 to 4,201 cases in 
which review was sought in the Supreme Court comparing 1960 
with 1982. 11 The least dramatic increase occurred in Supreme 
Court decisions on the merits, increasing from 105 cases in 1960 to 
196 cases in 1982,12 but this does not reflect the enormously en-
hanced burden of screening cases for review within its discretionary 
jurisdiction. 
wards, The Rising Workload and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causa-
tion-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871 (1983); 
Harper, The Breakdown in Federal Appeals, 70 A.B.A. J. 56 (Feb. 1984); and Meador, Fed-
eral Judiciary-Inflation. Malfunction. and Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 
617. 
5. R. POSNER, supra, at 68. 
6. !d. 
7. /d. at 70-73. Judge Posner postulates that the increased proportion of appeals in 
which the trial court was reversed in his sample of cases from 1983, in contrast to the 1960 
sample, and the greater number of appeals presenting multiple issues in the former year, 
equate with greater complexity and hence increased workload. 
8. !d. at 27. 
9. !d. at 61-64. 
10. /d. 
II. !d. at 74. Judge Posner used 1982 as the comparison year for the Supreme Court 
because complete data were not available to him. The comparable figure for 1983 was 4,155. 
98 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1984). 
12. PoSNER, supra, at 75. The comparable figure for 1983 was 163. 98 HARV. L. REV. 
314 (1984). 
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Judge Posner's thesis is that this rise in demand for federal ju-
dicial services, combined with the inadequate institutional response 
thereto, has resulted in a marked deterioration in the quality of 
those services for which the term "crisis" is not an overblown or 
hyperbolic description. Somewhat surprising to this reviewer is that 
the moderately greater time between initial filings and final disposi-
tions, what Posner calls "the federal court queue," again comparing 
1983 with 1960, ranks as the least adverse consequence. Thus, be-
tween 1960 and 1983, the average time between filing and disposi-
tion after trial in the district courts increased by only 1.2 months, 
between noticing appeals and disposition in the courts of appeals by 
only 2.8 months, and between filings in the district courts and dis-
positions in the courts of appeals by only 1.4 months.IJ But the 
principal method by which this exemplary timeliness of disposition 
has been maintained in the face of bloated dockets is, in Judge Pos-
ner's view, at the core of the crisis of deteriorating quality. In his 
words: 
The principal method of accommodating the caseload increase has been to ex-
pand the number of supporting personnel in the federal court. Not only do the 
hundreds of federal bankruptcy judges have more powers than their predecessors, 
the referees in bankruptcy, but the period since 1960 has seen the creation of a new 
and important federal judicial officer called a magistrate, of whom there are now 
almost 500 ... operating as a kind of junior district judge. There has also been a big 
expansion in the number of law clerks, and the creation of a kind of floating law 
clerk called a staff attorney. Many district judges and court of appeals judges now 
also use "ex terns," who are law students working as junior law clerks in exchange 
for course credit from their law schools; this practice was unknown in 1960.14 
Judge Posner does not contend that these ancillary personnel 
do not do their assigned tasks well. On the contrary, he gives them 
generally high marks for ability and industriousness. The problem 
is that they create a degree of distance between the judge, the ulti-
mate decisionmaker, and the judicial product, primarily the opin-
ion, that is inimical to high quality in the latter. "The federal courts 
increasingly resemble executive branch and independent agencies, 
where a few poorly paid senior officials preside over a bureaucracy 
. . . . [T]he specter of bureaucracy increasingly haunts the federal 
judiciary." ts 
Posner is most worried about the enlarged role as well as the 
number of law clerks which he believes has been brought about by 
the need to accommodate the vastly increased caseload. 16 Again, 
13. POSNER, supra, at 96. 
14. !d. at 97. 
IS. !d. at 39. 
16. In 1960, each Supreme Court Justice had two law clerks; court of appeals and dis-
trict judges one. In 1983, Supreme Court Justices were authorized four law clerks, although 
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the problem is not that the clerks are incompetent, or willful, or 
that they have been permitted to intrude upon the decisionmaking 
authority of their judges, but rather that the pressure of having to 
process an ever increasing number of cases has led to delegation to 
them of the tasks, not only of researching, but also of writing opin-
ions. The judges have therefore tended to become merely editors of 
their opinions, and supervisors and coordinators of the work of 
their clerks, secretaries, and staff attorneys. He is concerned that, 
despite the best efforts of the judge-editors to whom they are re-
sponsible, opinions written by law clerks are likely to be markedly 
inferior to those personally authored by judges. In style, they tend 
to be "colorless and plethoric, and also heavily given to euphe-
mism."n "Instead of using language to highlight the things being 
discussed, the standard [law clerk] style draws a veil over reality, 
making it harder to see exactly what the judge is doing."Is Clerks 
are inclined to write opinions that are prolix, riddled with banali-
ties, platitudinous, and burdened with excessive footnotes and cita-
tions. Worst of all, in Judge Posner's view, they lack candor and 
straightforwardness; hence their value as sources of authority for 
lawyers and other judges is greatly depreciated. "To write novels 
and to edit novels written by others are on different planes of crea-
tivity, and I think there is a similar difference in judicial creativity 
between writing one's own opinions and reviewing opinions written 
by one's law clerks." I9 
The parlous effects of the aggrandizement of the law clerks are 
not limited to depreciation in the quality of the work product of the 
federal courts. They also have the incidental but important conse-
quence of reducing the job satisfaction and attractiveness of being a 
federal judge: 
It is a curious feature of the American legal system that a handful of famous 
judges should have made a contribution to the law so greatly disproportionate to 
their number. But it is true; and it would be sad to think there will never be another 
great American judge. Yet one wonders whether an editor can be a great judge. It 
is not just a failure of imagination ... that makes me unable to visualize Oliver 
Wende!! Holmes coordinating a team of law clerks and secretaries and polishing the 
drafts that the clerks submitted to him. The sense of style that is inseparable from 
the idea of a great judge in our tradition is unlikely to develop in a judge who does 
not do his own writing.20 
At a time when the relative paltriness of federal judicial sala-
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens employ only three and two, respectively. Court of appeals 
judges are authorized three, and district judges two law clerks. !d. at I 02-04. 
17. !d. at 107. 
18. /d. at 108. 
19. /d. at Ill. 
20. /d. 
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ries is thought to be driving many of the best judges off the bench, 
and discouraging many of the best suited lawyers from accepting 
appointment, any deterioration in the intellectual and professional 
gratifications of the position is especially unfortunate. 
An obvious solution to the crisis would be simply to appoint 
more federal judges. But Judge Posner believes that any substantial 
increase in the number of court of appeals judges could not be ac-
complished without risking the present generally very high quality 
which now prevails. For every one of the 648 lower court federal 
judges presently sitting, there might well be among the American 
bar four or five potential and theoretically available recruits whose 
appointment would not degrade in the slightest the aggregate qual-
ity of the federal judicial corps, leaving judicial inexperience out of 
account. (This is the reviewer's highly impressionistic guess, not 
Judge Posner's.) But a very large segment of this potential ap-
pointee pool is not realistically available, because of unwillingness 
to accept lower salaries or other working conditions of a federal 
judgeship, political or ideological incompatibility with an incum-
bent President, inability to meet the admittedly inconsistently ap-
plied special requirement of extensive trial experience for a 
favorable rating from the American Bar Association Standing Com-
mittee on the Judiciary,21 or simply lack of interest in judicial work. 
Even if these impediments could be surmounted to the point 
where a greater portion of professionally qualified lawyers could be 
tapped, Judge Posner does not believe that much of the solution to 
the crisis of the federal courts lies in the creation of additional 
judgeships. This is primarily because of the acutely pyramidal 
structure of the federal judiciary, and the practical obstacles in the 
way of increasing the capacity of the tribunal at the apex of the 
pyramid, the Supreme Court, by augmenting its membership or by 
any other feasible means. Any diminution in the opinionwriting 
burden per Justice that might be achieved by adding, say, two new 
Justices, would almost certainly be offset by the aggravated difficul-
ties of forging majorities among a larger group of people. A some-
what similar objection can be raised against either increasing the 
number of judicial circuits, which would breed a larger number of 
intercircuit conflicts, or enlarging the number of judges assigned to 
21. Judge Posner ventures an interesting explanation for the Committee's strong em-
phasis on trial experience, with which he disagrees. By requiring recent and substantial trial 
experience, particularly for district court appointments, the ABA can pronounce political 
hacks unqualified on the basis of an objective criterion, whose application is not subject to 
dispute like a subjective standard such as general legal ability. /d. at 30 n.9. The Committee 
has sensibly been willing to dispense with this requirement in cases where it has other assur-
ance of professional qualification, as in the author's own instance. 
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the most heavily burdened circuits, which, by increasing the poten-
tial for intracircuit conflicts among panels, would heighten the need 
for cumbersome and time-consuming en bane hearings of cases. 
Judge Posner concedes that these difficulties have little application 
at the district court level, but it is at this level, he believes, that the 
crisis is least acute, primarily because district judges do not, for the 
most part, function collegially, and because they play a decidedly 
subordinate role in the lawmaking as opposed to law application 
and factfinding. In any event, the obstacle to the creation of any 
significant number of new district judgeships might well be of a dif-
ferent sort; that is, the pool of potential appointees as well fitted for 
the special and extraordinary demands of this position as the aver-
age of the existing corps of federal trial judges is possibly relatively 
much smaller than is the case with potential appointees to the 
courts of appeals. 
If appointment of additional judges does not commend itself as 
a solution, what remedies does Judge Posner propose? In fact, he 
considers a broad array of them, some grouped under the heading 
of "palliatives," and others that he regards as more thoroughgoing 
and systemic. Among the former are: "raising the price of access 
to the federal courts; limiting or abolishing the diversity jurisdic-
tion; moving toward a system of specialized federal appellate courts; 
reforming administrative review; and creating a kind of junior 
Supreme Court to assist the Supreme Court in assuring a reasonable 
uniformity of federal decisional law."22 
Judge Posner concedes that some of the costs of litigation are 
rightfully subsidized by taxpayers to reflect the externalized bene-
fits, primarily the clarification and elaboration of the law, to society 
at large, but thinks that the subsidy available to "users" of the fed-
eral courts has become excessive, to the point where many cases 
that should be handled in state courts are dysfunctionally attracted 
into the federal system. He therefore proposes that the fees for fil-
ing or removing civil cases involving nonindigent parties to federal 
court be substantially increased from the present basic fee of $60 to 
roughly $1,000. 23 He also favors broader use of the device of two-
way shifting of attorneys' fees to deter fruitless litigation by overly 
optimistic plaintiffs or defendants.24 
Judge Posner joins ranks with such well-known advocates of 
curtailing the beleaguered diversity jurisdiction as Chief Justice 
Warren Burger and Judges Henry Friendly and Clement Hayns-
22. !d. at 130-31. 
23. !d. at 133. 
24. !d. at 137-38. 
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worth. He points out that, even on the extremely doubtful assump-
tion that the putative original rationale for this anomalous category 
of jurisdiction, the supposed bias of local juries against out-of-state 
litigants, retains any contemporary validity, it makes no sense to 
permit home-state plaintiffs to invoke it against out-of-state defend-
ants.zs He would have Congress disallow this, and overcomes his 
general skepticism about the utility of amount-in-controversy re-
quirements to the point of urging that the present $10,000 amount 
be raised to at least $50,000, which would be just a bit more than an 
adjustment for inflation since 1958, when the former amount was 
set. 
Judge Posner considers, but for the most part rejects, the idea 
of creating new federal appellate courts of nationwide jurisdiction 
and specialized subject-matter competency much beyond the re-
cently created Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.26 He does 
so out of concern that, if so much paramountcy in such areas as 
federal antitrust or criminal law were concentrated in a single court 
having a near monopoly of appellate authority in its assigned field, 
albeit subject to occasional review by the Supreme Court, the strug-
gle to secure control of its composition would be exacerbated to an 
unwholesome degree. Another objection he sees is that this would 
deprive the Supreme Court of the benefit of review against the help-
ful background of multiple and diverse resolutions of emerging and 
difficult issues by the generalist courts of appeals. 
Another "palliative" advanced by Judge Posner with greater 
enthusiasm is that the quality and thoroughness of appellate review 
within the federal administrative agencies be improved: 
With the appellate process within the agencies strengthened, the scope of fed-
eral [judicial] review of administrative decisions could be reduced. In the case of 
social security disability benefits, maybe it could be eliminated altogether; and cer-
tainly there would be no need for the two tiers of judicial review that we now 
have-review in the district court with a right of appeal to the court of appeals.27 
Requiring, and providing the necessary resources for, well-rea-
soned opinions within the agency structure might well deter some of 
the appeals that are now taken to the courts from administrative 
adjudications. A more thoroughly developed record, including 
such an opinion, would in any event facilitate the work of the judges 
in cases that did reach them. 
25. !d. at 146. 
26. Created in 1983, this new court assumed the jurisdiction previously vested in the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appeJlate division of the Court of Claims. See 
28 u.s.c. § 1295. 
27. POSNER, supra, at 161. 
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The proposal, which has been bruited around for more than a 
decade, to reduce the workload of the Supreme Court by creating a 
new federal court with nationwide jurisdiction and having the sole 
task of resolving conflicts among the circuits, has little appeal for 
Judge Posner. He is unpersuaded that the Supreme Court is in fact 
overburdened by cases presenting intercircuit conflicts, or that 
prompter or more pervasive resolution of such conflicts would be 
sound judicial policy.zs If the courts of appeals are generating more 
conflicts among themselves than might be desirable, he proposes 
that they consider a self-imposed, and presumably informal, policy 
of deference whereby, if the first three circuits to consider a given 
issue agreed upon its resolution, then all courts of appeals before 
whom the same issue subsequently arose would follow suit. Judge 
Posner also sees problems with the most frequently proposed 
method of manning this "junior Supreme Court"-random selec-
tion of members from among sitting court of appeals judges, which 
would drain off resources from the very courts where the crisis is 
perceived by him as most pressing. 
To this writer, the most interesting portion of The Federal 
Courts consists of those chapters wherein Judge Posner moves be-
yond procedural adjustments and matters of institutional design of 
the sort just summarized, his "palliatives," and turns to develop-
ment of themes which penetrate to the core and substance of federal 
jurisdiction, and even to the nature of adjudication and the craft of 
appellate judging in the most fundamental terms. To the hasty 
reader, the author's excursions into the realms of legal process and 
applied jurisprudence may seem at first blush to be somewhat gratu-
itous interpolations which ill consort with the book's central preoc-
cupation with matters of institutional structure. That reaction 
would be a mistake. For Judge Posner's unifying premise is that the 
judiciary's essential task of rendering judgment must be kept con-
stantly in mind as one appraises malfunctions in the system. 
Few would deny that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal 
courts should be substantially contracted. Posner goes further, ar-
guing that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the inferior federal 
courts that is keyed to enforcement of rights and liabilities arising 
under federal substantive law has become considerably more exten-
sive than warranted by any tenable concept deducible from the con-
stitutional empowerment of Congress to establish and deploy such 
courts in complete or partial derogation of the residual general ju-
risdiction of state courts. His model for what he calls the "optimal 
28. !d. at 163. 
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scope of federal jurisdiction"29 is erected upon the postulate that 
not all cases arising under federal law should be assigned to the 
exclusive, or even the concurrent, jurisdiction of the inferior federal 
courts, but rather only that subcategory of such cases which call for 
the special measure of independence from political influences af-
forded federal judges by article III of the Constitution, an indepen-
dence greater than that typically enjoyed by their state 
counterparts. Federal question cases falling outside this subcat-
egory can, in his opinion, be prudently and more efficiently left to 
the general jurisdiction of state courts, subject of course to Supreme 
Court review. 
Since state court judges can be expected to be less independent of state political 
forces than federal judges when both are residents of a state adversely affected by 
federal regulation, a state court may be an unsympathetic tribunal in a case where a 
federal right has been created in order to correct an interstate externality. 3D 
In other words, only when a federally created right or regula-
tory scheme is intended to require each state to bear some cost or 
burden (i.e., internalized) which, left to its own preferences or in the 
hands of its own judges, it might be tempted to cast off upon other 
states or the nation as a whole (i.e., externalize), is there a compel-
ling case made out for jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. The 
concept of externalities is, of course, a fundamental element of eco-
nomic cost-benefit analysis, and has its most obvious applications in 
contexts posing conflicts of palpably economic interests. Among 
the states an obvious example is the problem of regulating interstate 
pollution. State court judges, out of their supposed greater suscepti-
bility to parochial influences, might be marginally more prone than 
federal judges to give an erroneously stringent or lenient interpreta-
tion and application of federal statutes addressed to this problem, 
depending upon whether they reside in a state which is the victim or 
the source of interstate pollution. 
Judge Posner's examples of federal statutes regulating eco-
nomic activity, but not substantially concerned with adjustment of 
interstate externalities, are the federal Truth-in-Lending statute, the 
odometer-tampering statute, and the federal securities acts as ap-
plied to small, local corporations. These have in common the char-
acteristic that the benefits and costs of enforcement are both likely 
to fall within the same state, and are therefore unlikely to pose any 
temptation to externalize costs. Much the same is true of some fed-
eral question cases which are more compensatory than regulatory in 
29. /d. at 175. 
30. /d. 
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purpose, such as those brought under the Federal Employers Liabil-
ity Act. 
Posner expands the reach of his externalities model to include 
categories of federal jurisdiction which are not concerned with eco-
nomic interests in the strict sense of the term. Thus, in the contexts 
of habeas corpus and civil rights claims, he analogizes claims or 
claimants invoking federal law likely to be unpopular or disfavored 
by local influences within a state to those which impose material 
costs or burdens with no offsetting benefits. For example, he does 
not believe that state judges are any less concerned than federal 
judges to avoid convictions of innocent criminal defendants, and so 
would restrict the scope of federal habeas corpus to claims that state 
courts have erroneously rejected a federal constitutional rule in-
tended to deter police or prosecutorial misconduct in contrast to a 
rule intended to assure the reliability of guilty verdicts.3I He 
reaches a similar conclusion with respect to such federal civil rights 
claims as asserted violations of the Age Discrimination Act and 
public employee claims of discharge in violation of due process, 
which he believes are not likely to be unsympathetically handled by 
state judges, because they are not locally unpopular. 
The author concedes that, when all of these federal law claims 
have been sorted out and allocated or reallocated according to his 
broadly conceived externalities criterion, the attendant reduction in 
the federal courts' caseload would still be quite modest. He esti-
mates it at twenty percent in the district courts and twenty-one per-
cent in the courts of appeals.32 But when this is combined with the 
significant contraction of the diversity jurisdiction he also advo-
cates,33 the total reduction is by no means inconsequential. 
The overextension of the federal question jurisdiction has re-
sulted, in Judge Posner's view, not only from its unnecessarily en-
larged formal delineation, but also from an extravagant 
proliferation of the substantive claims to which this jurisdictional 
category applies, a proliferation derived from dubious interpreta-
tions of the Constitution and, to a lesser extent, Acts of Congress. 
He is in emphatic disagreement with the dominant, contemporary 
"noninterpretist" approach to constitutional interpretation, under 
whose auspices a plethora of recently discovered rights have been 
established. He is, however, no thoroughgoing "originalist," and is 
willing to countenance recognition of evolving constitutional norms 
31. /d. at 186-87. 
32. !d. at 189. 
33. /d. at 146. 
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not traceable to the intent of the framers. Posner's constitutional 
philosophy is expressed in these paragraphs: 
The Civil War taught a Jesson about the instrument the framers had 
drafted, ... that they had made a mistake in putting the social institutions of the 
states almost completely beyond the reach of the federal judicial power. . . . The 
Civil War showed that there cannot be an American nation if the states are totally 
free to go their own way in the matter of social arrangements. Some minimum 
homogeneity of social institutions is necessary if people are to consider themselves 
American first and Georgians or New Yorkers second . 
. . . I shall assume that [the fourteenth amendment] was intended to give the 
Supreme Court broad discretion to invalidate state laws, and having made that as-
sumption shall ask how the discretion should be guided. . . . 
The usual answer to the question of how to guide judicial discretion in inter-
preting open-ended constitutional provisions, including the due process clause, is 
summed up in the words "natural law." 
I offer in a speculative spirit the following alternative to natural law ... a Jaw 
that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property in violation of a fundamental 
social norm held by most of the nation denies due process. If Indiana adopted the 
Islamic code of punishment, or Florida authorized torture in police interrogation, 
or New Mexico decided to censor its newspapers, or California abolished the right 
to trial for crimes, these states would be violating the due process clause. 
Notice that I am using as my index of consensus state legislation. I am not 
suggesting that the content of the due process clause should change with the latest 
public opinion polls. 
Obviously my view is incompatible with the idea that the due process clause 
"incorporated" any provision of the Bill of Rights in toto. . . . The Bill of Rights 
was intended to weaken the federal government; apply the Bill of Rights to the 
states ... and you weaken the states tremendously by handing over control of large 
areas of public policy to the federal judges, whose interpretations of the Bill of 
Rights are (short of constitutional amendment) conclusive of its meaning . 
. . . This anchor limits the subjective, ad hoc character of the concept; the judge 
is not free to set his personal views against the views embodied in the public policy 
of a majority of the states. 
It is a necessary condition of unconstitutionality under this approach that the 
challenged state practice be followed in only a minority of the states. But it is not a 
sufficient condition. The goal is not to stifle experimentation but to prevent devia-
tions from the national consensus that are so extreme, so shocking, that they 
threaten national unity. 34 
It would be difficult to find a more constrained conception of 
due process than this. It is hard to imagine a Supreme Court 
guided by Judge Posner's standard exercising much meaningful 
control over the states. However well or ill considered are his ex-
amples of state laws violative of due process, it is entirely clear that 
he considers a posture of very nearly total deference to be the ap-
propriate one. This is judicial restraint for those who like it neat, 
envisioning as it does a more limited role for federal courts in en-
34. !d. at 192-95 (footnotes omitted). 
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forcing constitutional norms against the states than all but the most 
literal minded of originalists. Of course this discussion relates only 
to the due process clause as a substantive limitation of state legisla-
tive power, and perhaps this stringent standard of judicial review is 
not intended by Judge Posner to apply pari passu to the equal pro-
tection clause or to constitutional limitations against the power of 
the federal government. This is not a book primarily about consti-
tutional law, and he does not single out these matters for separate 
extended elaboration. To the extent that considerations peculiar to 
federalism inform this highly restrictive formulation, it is a fair in-
ference that Judge Posner would vouchsafe a considerably more in-
terventionist role to the federal courts vis-a-vis the federal 
government. 
At another point in the book, Posner sums up his general the-
ory of constitutional interpretation: 
I am speaking only of cases in which the meaning of the Constitution is un-
clear. I do not mean to place the minority at the mercy of the majority; that would 
deny the very concept of a constitutional right. . . . But if a court cannot honestly 
determine whether such a right exists then it should be denied; doubts should be 
resolved against the claimant. . . . [I]t is the counsel of prudence for courts to yield 
to the dominant power when to do so does not deny a clear constitutional right. 
When in doubt, the democratic principle, reinforced by concern for maintaining the 
courts' political capital, should lead the courts to interpret governmental powers 
broadly, and rights against government narrowly.35 
What a wide world of disputation lies embedded in that short 
modifier "clear"! Few even of our most activist judges would avow 
disagreement with this formulation, however discrepant might be 
their practice. For Judge Posner, "clear" constitutional rights, at 
least against the states, are rights not to be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property other than in accord with practices well established in 
any respectable minority of the states. This standard would tilt ju-
dicial review toward the preservation of traditional, customary 
norms and practices, and make of it a conservative rather than a 
reformist force, retarding rather than fostering change on those few 
occasions when it is exerted at all. It harkens back to the venerable 
conception of due process articulated by Justice Cardozo in his fa-
mous opinion in Palko v. Connecticut,36 and by such constitutional 
scholars as James Bradley Thayer37 and Edward S. Corwin3s in an 
earlier era. It is also more faithful to the logic of Marbury v. 
35. /d. at 273-74. 
36. 302 u.s. 319 (1937). 
37. See generally Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
38. See generally Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 
HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911). 
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Madison,39 with its emphasis upon reserving the power of invalida-
tion only for cases of nearly literal repugnancy between the Consti-
tution and the challenged statute, than is the dominant practice of 
recent decades. 
Judge Posner believes that the crisis of the federal courts has 
been exacerbated by some shortcomings of modern judicial tech-
nique. One such shortcoming, the prevalence of unduly lengthy 
opinions, larded with unhelpful string citations and prolific foot-
notes, has already been mentioned. 40 Another is the proliferation of 
concurring opinions which add little but bulk to the federal report-
ers and grist for the mills of law clerks eager to display their learn-
ing in the best (or worst) law review style. He is also trenchantly 
critical of dissenting opinions which are principally concerned with 
impugning the intellectual integrity of the majority: 
To put it bluntly, many contemporary federal appellate opinions seem to be 
self-indulgent displays performed with little concern for ... the audience . . . . A 
self-indulgent opinion is ... much longer than it need be ... , the author having 
made no effort to prune it of facts, procedural history, and citations that are unnec-
essary to an understanding of the decision. . . . [I]t is also irresponsible; it subordi-
nates the judge's institutional obligations to his delight in self-expression, or more 
mundanely to his reluctance ... to curb the self-expressive ardors of his law clerks . 
. . . There are opinions that, once the boilerplate of procedural details, supernu-
merary facts, and redundant or inapposite citations is stripped away, are actually 
too short; the analysis is missing. 
Another and increasingly common manifestation of excessive judicial self-as-
sertion is the abuse-often shrill, sometimes nasty-of one's colleagues. Nothing is 
less helpful, less convincing, or less edifying to the professional readers of judicial 
opinions ... than denunciations of a disagreeing colleague.41 
Judge Posner does not essay any explanation of the root causes 
of what he describes as "a deficient spirit of institutional responsibil-
ity,"42 beyond the multiplication of the law clerks, which he de-
scribes as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of this 
indiscipline. (My own decidedly idiosyncratic explanation for most 
of our current ills, including judicial "logorrhea," is that it is due to 
the decline in the study of classical languages!) 
Judge Posner also criticizes the failure, in so many cases, of the 
courts of appeals to write any generally published opinion at all, a 
direct and particularly lamentable consequence of the caseload 
explosion: 
The federal courts of appeals have adapted to the caseload explosion in part by 
39. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
40. See supra notes 18-20. 
41. PosNER. supra, at 230-32 (footnotes omitted). 
42. /d. at 241. 
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reducing the quality of their output. This is an inevitable cost of the commitment to 
accommodate all increases in the demand for federal judicial services without rais-
ing the direct or indirect price of those services . . . . If the caseload continues to 
grow in the years ahead, the quality of the federal courts will continue to decline 
unless major changes are made in the system.43 
Judge Posner makes a convincing point about another phe-
nomenon that might in part fall under the heading of judicial tech-
nique, and which seems to this reviewer to bear even greater 
emphasis than he gives it. That is the strong attraction which mul-
tifaceted standards seems to hold for contemporary judges, in lieu 
of the more definite legal rules they have tended to displace. As he 
puts it: 
The choice between rule and standard has profound institutional implications. 
Because a rule is more definite, the adoption of a rule will increase legal certainty 
and thereby reduce the amount of litigation; it will also make each lawsuit simpler 
and shorter . . . . [G]enerally rules reduce and standards increase the amount as 
well as the length of litigation, and in a time of acute caseload pressures these conse-
quences make rules attractive. Yet courts seem to shy away from declaring definite 
rules. They prefer to avoid definite decision by announcing a vague standard or, 
what amounts to the same thing, a multifactored test with equal weighting of each 
factor, leaving to the indefinite future the resolution of the uncertainties implicit in 
such an approach.44 
The Federal Courts is a book that will alarm, even infuriate, 
some readers, partly because of the author's rigorously positivist 
theory of constitutional interpretation, and partly because many 
people react with suspicion verging on paranoia to any suggestion 
that the jurisdiction of federal courts be contracted or access to 
them made more difficult. However, much of what Judge Posner 
has here written is not linked to any sort of ideological commit-
ment, but rather consists of cold-eyed, carefully considered analysis 
of the institutional and operational function of the federal courts. 
Few are likely to come away from reading this work unconvinced 
that these courts do in fact face a crisis, and that all indications are 
that the crisis will progress to a condition of near disablement un-
less some remedies are soon devised and urgently implemented. 
Many of the remedies Judge Posner proposes strike this reviewer as 
self-evidently sound and urgently called for. Others are clearly 
more problematic, but this surely does nothing to detract from the 
ongoing discussion, both within and without the profession, to 
which his book is a notable contribution. 
43. /d. at 124. 
44. /d. at 245. 
